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WEEKLY SECURITY BRIEFING

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WEEKLY SECURITY BRIEFING · REPORTING WEEK 41 / 2026

Weekly Security Briefing

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Executive Summary — This Week's Key Global Developments

- **Hormuz strike tempo:** United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) displayed a new run of tanker incidents in the Strait of Hormuz from the evening of 28 September through 4 October. The public cards name no perpetrator, no hull and no new fatality. Warnings 144-26 through 150-26 — seven products — are classified as attacks. Warning 143-26 is suspicious activity, not an attack. Warning 151-26 is suspicious activity south of Al Mukha, not a Hormuz strike.
- **Kyiv's grid:** On 30 September Russia launched what Prime Minister Serhiy Koryntskyi called the largest combined energy attack since the last heating season, centred on Kyiv. The BBC reported at least five dead, including a child in the Kyiv region, and confirmed damage at the Trypilska plant. Reuters reported Ukrainian officials putting deaths at seven, and said Ukrenergo imposed emergency cuts in Kyiv and three surrounding regions for the first time since the spring. Those tolls are not reconciled. On 4 October Russia's defence ministry told Reuters it would intensify strikes on military facilities and defence-industry sites in Kyiv and elsewhere.
- **Taiz cut off from Aden:** On 4 October four security sources told AFP that Houthi fighters had taken al-Safiya, cut the main road from Taiz to Aden and seized the local police station. The city itself remained under government control. President Rashad al-Alimi announced the same day the start of operations to retake remaining Houthi-held territory. This is a ground-access problem. It does not identify who fired at tankers east of Oman.
- **Debris on NATO's edge:** On 3 October President Maia Sandu said Russian missiles and drones had violated Moldovan airspace and exploded on Moldovan soil. POLITICO reported three missiles and two drones between 07:45 and 08:00, fragments in Hincesti, Anenii Noi and Causeni, a fire, and no casualties. Lithuania closed Vilnius airport for about an hour the same morning after an unidentified object, possibly crossing from Belarus.
- **South China Sea, not a Taiwan crisis:** On 4 October the Philippine Coast Guard said two China Coast Guard vessels blocked a law-enforcement team near Pag-asa (Thitu) that was pursuing a foreign fishing boat suspected of dynamite fishing. A People's Liberation Army Navy helicopter circled the Philippine boats. The pursuit was abandoned. Separately, Manila said a Chinese J-16 flew close to a Philippine patrol aircraft over Scarborough Shoal on 3 October. No collision and no injury were reported.
- **Access appliances:** On 4 October the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added CVE-2026-88779 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, due 7 October for covered US federal civilian agencies, with forensic triage required. Citrix bulletin CTX697174 describes a memory overflow that can deny service when a customer-managed NetScaler is a SAML service provider or identity provider. Fixed builds are 14.1-73.41, 13.1-64.28 and the matching FIPS lines. This is not CVE-2026-88771 or CVE-2026-88772. September patches for that pair do not close 88779.

Key Developments & Intelligence Assessment

Europe**HIGH****The heating-season campaign opened with a mass strike on Kyiv's power system**

What happened on 30 September: Russia launched a large combined strike on Ukrainian energy sites, above all around Kyiv. Prime Minister Serhiy Koryukhyn told the BBC it was the first mass combined attack of this scale since the end of the last heating season, and that there had effectively not been a day without an energy attack since the summer. He said at least five people were killed overnight, including a child in the Kyiv region, and that 11 regions were hit, with homes, social facilities, civilian enterprises and railways among the targets. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said three people were killed in the capital, including a utility worker at a warehouse. A further death was reported in Mykolaiv. Two deaths in Sumy were attributed to Tuesday, a day earlier, and should not be folded into the Wednesday overnight total without a single official table.

The grid effect was immediate and uneven. Reuters reported that Ukrenergo imposed emergency power cuts in Kyiv and three surrounding regions, the first such measure in the capital since the spring. Kyiv's water utility reduced system pressure. The energy ministry said some households in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Sumy and Kharkiv were still without power on Wednesday. Ukrenergo asked residents not to use powerful appliances between 10:00 and 16:00. DTEK said it had restored power to 8,000 homes. That count shows one private supplier could reconnect a slice of customers while emergency restrictions were still in force. It does not show the capital back to normal.

Trypilska was damaged. What it "supports" is a claim, not a finding. Russia's defence ministry said targets included the Trypilska thermal plant, about 40 kilometres from Kyiv, and claimed the plant supplied Ukrainian defence facilities. Centrenergy, the operator, confirmed damage and said it was assessing the scale. The operator's confirmation covers damage. It does not confirm the defence-supply allegation. Zelenskyy said critical infrastructure was struck in Zhytomyr, Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad and Rivne. Those are presidential statements of where strikes landed, not a completed damage survey.

The death toll is still two official accounts. The BBC's figure is at least five, including the child in the Kyiv region, killed by Koryukhyn, Klitschko, the Kyiv regional head and the Mykolaiv acting head. Reuters, in a dispatch from Kyiv the same day, reported Ukrainian officials putting the dead at seven, and quoted Zelenskyy saying a child was among those seven, with critical infrastructure hit in five regions. Both wires are citing Ukrainian officials. They do not match. No single number should be used until one table replaces the split.

On 4 October Moscow said the campaign would intensify. Reuters reported that the Russian defence ministry would step up attacks on military facilities, defence-industry sites and related infrastructure in Kyiv and elsewhere, after a Zelenskyy interview published on 3 October in which he said Ukraine would increase attacks on Russian oil refineries and would not target civilians. The ministry described its recent strikes, including hits on bridges across the Dnipro, as a response to what it called Ukrainian attacks on civilian targets inside Russia. Both governments deny targeting civilians. The narrower point is that Kyiv has already had emergency cuts, a damaged thermal plant and a public threat of more strikes before the heating season has properly started.

The ground claim is not a new map. The BBC reported that Ukraine's Third Army Corps said it had retaken several settlements near Lyman in an operation it calls Vivaldi, and that the front elsewhere remained largely stagnant. That is a corps statement carried by one broadcaster, not an independently mapped change of control. The exposure this week is power and water in Kyiv. Named-plant status, starting with Trypilska, is a better indicator than a restored household count from one night.

Intelligence Assessment

High Europe remains high because Russia has opened the heating-season strike pattern against Kyiv's power system and has said it will intensify attacks on military-related infrastructure. Confidence is high that the 30 September strike happened, that Trypilska was damaged, and that Ukrenergo imposed emergency cuts in the capital for the first time since the spring. Confidence is lower in any single death toll, because the BBC and Reuters accounts do not match, and in Russia's claim that Trypilska supplies defence facilities. The Lyman claim remains a corps statement. The rating is urban power and water, plus debris on NATO's edge, not a collapse of Ukrainian resistance.

ALSO MONITORED THIS WEEK

- **Moldovan debris:** On 3 October Sandu said Russian missiles and drones, including what she called Banderol missiles, had entered Moldovan airspace and exploded on Moldovan territory. POLITICO reported three missiles and two drones in a 15-minute window that morning, fragments in Hincesti, Anenii Noi and Causeni, a vegetation fire, and no casualties. This is a civil-aviation and border-district problem next to the Ukraine strike wave. It is not evidence that Chişinău was the target.
- **Vilnius closure:** The same morning Lithuania closed Vilnius airport for about an hour and scrambled NATO jets after a dangerous airborne object, possibly crossing from Belarus. POLITICO did not identify the object. Until a Lithuanian or NATO identification is published, this stays a short airport closure, not a second Moldova-style debris event.

Middle East**CRITICAL****Tankers were struck in the Strait on successive days; none of the public warnings named the ship**

What the list shows: UKMTO's public incident list, as displayed on 5 October, carried nine products from the evening of 28 September through 4 October. They are not one attack. No warning in that set named a hull, an IMO number, a flag or a perpetrator. Crew reported safe is not an all-clear for the route.

28–30 September, mostly time-late. Warning 143-26 is suspicious activity, not an attack: a third party reported a vessel struck by a suspected projectile on the evening of 28 September, a fire extinguished, the ship underway, crew safe, and no environmental impact or damage assessment. Warnings 144-26, 145-26 and 146-26 are attacks, displayed on 30 September, and described as time-late. A verified source reported a crude tanker struck on the port side (144), an inbound tanker struck (145), and a tanker struck (146). Those three cards do not state crew condition, damage location or pollution, and they do not identify an LNG carrier. A flag, a hull name or an LNG label that is not in the UKMTO text is not an identification.

1–2 October. Warning 147-26, displayed on 1 October, is an attack warning based on a third-party report: a tanker in the Strait, an unknown projectile, a fire, crew reported safe, damage assessment and environmental impact unknown at the time of the report. Warning 148-26 is the cleanest timestamp in the set. The master reported at 1122 UTC on 2 October that an outbound tanker had been struck by an unknown projectile, causing a small fire and a blackout. The fire was extinguished. The vessel was underway. UKMTO reported no casualties and no environmental impact. The issue date is the same day.

3–4 October, with the event time still open on the latest attack. Warning 149-26 is displayed as 3 October: a crude tanker four nautical miles east of Oman, the master reporting an unknown projectile on the port side, crew safe, no environmental impact reported at that time. An earlier account dated this warning to 2 October. The public list does not. The event time is therefore left open, and the display date is the one used here. Warning 150-26 was issued on 4 October. The master of a tanker in the Strait reported an unknown projectile and engine-room damage. The crew were reported safe. No environmental impact was reported. Authorities were investigating. The report date and report time are marked to be confirmed. Issuing the warning on 4 October does not establish that the strike occurred on 4 October. Reuters, carried by L'Orient Today the same day, reported the engine-room hit and the same two limits: crew safe, no pollution stated, time of the incident not specified.

Seven attack cards, not nine. Warnings 144-26 through 150-26 are the seven products classified as attacks. Warning 143-26 is suspicious activity. Warning 151-26 is not in the Strait. It is suspicious activity on 4 October, 60 nautical miles south of Al Mukha: a tanker company security officer reported explosions close to the ship, crew safe, no pollution reported. UKMTO did not classify it as an attack. Last week's confirmed fatality is not in this set. The absence of a new named death does not make the waterway a normal transit. Until an owner, a flag state or a later UKMTO product names the vessel, the operating unit is the warning, not the ship.

Houthis cut the Taiz–Aden road while the government announced a counter-offensive

What happened on 4 October: AFP, citing a police source and three military sources, reported that Houthi fighters had taken al-Safiya, cut the main road linking Taiz to Aden and seized the police station. Traffic on that road had been halted. Fighting was still going on. The city itself remained under government control, already besieged from the north, east and west. Farea Al-Muslimi, at Chatham House, told AFP the Houthis had isolated Taiz from Aden even if they had not taken the city. Reuters said Houthi forces had gained hilltops in the previous 48 hours and were advancing on the last road between Taiz and Aden. A hold on that road would leave Yemen's third-largest city effectively besieged.

The political response was an announcement, not a reversed front. President Rashad al-Alimi said in a televised address that the government was moving from preparation to operations to retake remaining territory. Regional and Western

officials had earlier told Reuters that Saudi Arabia and Yemeni allies were planning an assault. That planning claim is not a started offensive with a measurable result on 4 October. The World Food Programme, cited in the same wire report, said last week that three in four families in parts of Yemen were going hungry as fighting displaced people and disrupted supplies. That is the setting of the road cut. It is not a port closure.

This is not the Hormuz story. The September push toward Bab al-Mandab is background in the same reporting. It is not a seizure dated inside this window, and it does not identify who fired at tankers off Oman. A closed road changes Aden–Taiz movement. A projectile changes a voyage. Fuel, food and medical resupply into the city are the mechanisms, not the speech.

Intelligence Assessment

High The Middle East remains critical because UKMTO classified warnings 144-26 through 150-26 as attacks on tankers in the Strait through 4 October, including engine-room damage and a fire-and-blackout, while Houthi forces were reported to have cut the Taiz–Aden road. Confidence is high in the public-list classifications and display dates of 5 October, and lower in the event times of 149-26 and 150-26. No hull is named. Attribution is unestablished. Confidence is high that AFP and Reuters reported the al-Safiya road cut; confidence is medium that the road was still closed at publication, because fighting was described as ongoing. The ground fight and the Strait strikes stay on separate maps.

ALSO MONITORED THIS WEEK

- **Al Mukha explosions:** Warning 151-26, 4 October, is suspicious activity 60 nautical miles south of Al Mukha. A tanker reported explosions nearby. Crew safe, no pollution reported, not classified as an attack, not a Hormuz warning. It belongs on the Red Sea plot until a later product says the ship was hit.
- **Government strike claim:** The same AFP/Reuters report said that, a day before the road cut, Yemen's government said its forces had hit Houthi targets around the country, including Sanaa, Saada and positions near Taiz. That is a government claim carried by the wires. It is not an independently logged strike list, and the government's own air capacity is described as limited.
- **Houthi media claim:** Al-Masirah reported Saudi strikes in al-Jawf and Saada and at least two wounded. That is a Houthi channel. It is noted. It is not adopted as a strike log.

Africa

HIGH

An ambush near Niono killed soldiers and Russian paramilitaries; the day and the toll are not settled

What was reported: AFP, citing security sources and a local elected official, reported that jihadists ambushed a convoy near Niono, in Mali's Ségou region, and that at least three Malian soldiers and four Russian Africa Corps paramilitaries were killed. One security source put the dead at seven, "including at least four Russians and some Malian troops." The local official confirmed a toll of seven and said four wounded Russians were treated at a community health centre. JNIM claimed the attack. The Malian army acknowledged that a convoy had been attacked near Niono. Neither the army nor Africa Corps published a casualty figure.

The day and the convoy are disputed. AFP's sources placed the ambush on Sunday. RFI placed it on Monday 28 September, between Tiemaba and Wewo, north of Niono, and said drones were used before the attackers closed. RFI's sources confirmed at least four Russians killed. JNIM's claim, as carried by RFI, was seven Russians killed or wounded, without mentioning Malian soldiers. Africa Corps, according to RFI, claimed a joint operation in Ségou that day in which "up to 30 terrorists" were killed, without mentioning Russian dead near Niono. That split changes the force that was hit.

What can be said without picking a number: A convoy was attacked near Niono at the end of September. Russian personnel were among the dead on both wire accounts. JNIM claimed it. The army has acknowledged an attack and has not confirmed the toll.

Why it matters: Niono sits on the Ségou road system, not a remote desert post. A convoy ambush there, with Russian paramilitaries in the vehicles, means the Bamako–central Mali supply pattern is still being hit. The relevant evidence is whether the army's acknowledgement is followed by a route restriction, not the argument between four and seven dead. Until Bamako or Moscow publishes a figure, external tolls stay source-based estimates.

Intelligence Assessment

Medium Africa is rated high because a JNIM-claimed ambush near Niono killed Russian paramilitaries and, on the AFP account, Malian soldiers, while western Niger absorbed two further security-force attacks reported on 28 September and South Sudan's outlook still carries a famine risk into 2027. Confidence is medium: the Niono day is disputed, the army has not confirmed casualties, and the Niger tolls come from security sources. The rating is bounded to Ségou, western Niger, and South Sudan's conflict-affected food-access environment. It is not a continental deterioration, and South Sudan is not a Sahel story.

ALSO MONITORED THIS WEEK

- **Western Niger:** Reuters reported on 28 September, citing two security sources, that more than 50 members of Niger's security forces had been killed in two attacks in the west of the country. A gendarme convoy was ambushed near Abala-Filingué on Wednesday 23 September. A separate attack at Birni-N'Konni on Saturday 26 September killed more than 30 soldiers. Islamic State Sahel Province issued two claims on Sunday 27 September, according to SITE Intelligence Group, which described those statements on Monday 28 September — the same day as the wire. The incidents fall just before this reporting window; the wire confirmation falls inside it. Niamey has not published a matching toll. The sources called the attackers terrorists and gave no further detail.

- **Mali accountability report:** On 29 September Amnesty International published a report documenting killings of at least 34 civilians in seven localities in Ségou, Mopti and Timbuktu between June 2023 and December 2025, which it attributes to the Malian armed forces and Wagner personnel. It also describes torture at the Léré and Nampala bases and two drone strikes, at Ejdeir in March 2025 and Tangatta in November 2025, which Amnesty says killed at least 23 people. These are not this week's Niono dead. Wagner's deployment, on Amnesty's account, ran until June 2025, when Africa Corps succeeded it. The publication is the event inside this window. Bamako had not replied to findings shared on 3 August.
- **South Sudan forecast:** FEWS NET's September key-message update, covering September 2026 to January 2027, said conflict, drought and a weak economy were driving Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes and a risk of Famine. The outlook links deteriorating food access to conflict, drought and economic pressure. Its famine-risk warning is a forecast, not a famine declaration; it cannot be read as evidence of an October attack or transferred to the Sahel.

Asia

ELEVATED

Chinese vessels blocked a Philippine law-enforcement run near Pag-asa; a training site opened in Laos

What happened off Pag-asa: On 4 October the Philippine Coast Guard said Chinese vessels obstructed an inter-agency team — coast guard, navy and police maritime group — that was responding to suspected dynamite fishing near Sandy Cays 2 and 3, about three nautical miles west of Pag-asa, which Manila also calls Thitu. Two China Coast Guard vessels sounded horns, radio-challenged the Philippine boats, then shadowed and blocked them. A People's Liberation Army Navy helicopter circled the team four times. The Philippine Coast Guard called that an unnecessary act of intimidation. The foreign fishing vessel ignored orders to stop and sailed southwest toward Subi Reef. Philippine authorities ended the pursuit and returned to Pag-asa. No collision and no injury were reported. Manila said the China Coast Guard had no law-enforcement authority in Pag-asa's territorial sea.

The same weekend, a close pass at Scarborough. The Philippine military said a Chinese J-16 repeatedly approached a Philippine patrol aircraft over Scarborough Shoal, also called Bajo de Masinloc, on Saturday 3 October. The Armed Forces of the Philippines described a recurring pattern of unsafe manoeuvres against Philippine ships and aircraft. The Chinese embassy in Manila had not commented on the weekend incidents in the Reuters account carried by GMA News. This is coercion at sea and in the air around two Philippine-held or Philippine-claimed features. It is not a Taiwan Strait closure, and it is not a shot fired.

What Beijing announced in Laos: On 29 September the China-Laos Joint Support and Training Center at Ban Keun airport, in Vientiane Province, and the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy, went into operation. China Military Online said Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Khamlieng attended and a PLA delegation took part. The centre is jointly maintained, aimed at training Lao air-force pilots, and described as not directed at any third party. Reuters reported the same opening and noted that the ministry gave no detail on personnel, equipment or facilities. Aircraft types, a permanent combat unit, and any effect on civilian flights are not in the statement. The announcement provides no basis for assessing the site's combat reach. This is not a combat-base finding and not a notice that Vientiane's civilian airport has shut.

Why the rating is elevated, not high: The sharpest verified facts in Asia this week are a blocked law-enforcement run off Pag-asa, a close aerial pass at Scarborough, a narrowly described training site in Laos, and a disputed mine blast in the DMZ. None is a Taiwan Strait crisis. None suspended commercial movement around Taiwan or Korea. The rating rests on those regional facts. Maritime coercion and the contested mine finding increase exposure at specific patrol and border locations without establishing a region-wide interruption of transport.

Intelligence Assessment

High Asia is elevated, not high. Confidence is high in the 4 October Pag-asa blockage, the 3 October J-16 close approach at Scarborough, the 29 September Ban Keun opening as a pilot-training site, and the 30 September South Korean and UN Command statements on the DMZ mine. Confidence is low on what is stationed at Ban Keun. Pyongyang denies the mine finding. No verified development supports treating commercial movement around Taiwan or Korea as suspended. The rating is maritime coercion and a denied border incident. The exposure remains concentrated around disputed waters and the Korean border.

ALSO MONITORED THIS WEEK

- **DMZ mines:** Two mines exploded on 21 September about 10 metres south of the Military Demarcation Line, injuring three South Korean soldiers, two seriously, while troops cleared a path for a joint inspection. On 30 September Seoul blamed Pyongyang, demanded an apology, and said the blast breached the armistice. The UN Command said an armistice violation had occurred, citing an active North Korean mine found on the southern side during the 29 September inspection, not the blast alone. Kim Yo-jong denied responsibility the same day. The explosion sits just before this window. The blame, the denial and the armistice finding sit inside it.
- **Batanes survey ship:** On 2 October the Philippine foreign ministry rejected China's claim of sovereign rights off Batanes. The survey ship Jia Hai Ke 7 had been about 37 nautical miles northwest of Itbayat, inside the Philippine exclusive economic zone, since 28 September. Manila said it had given no consent for marine scientific research. On 1 October the coast guard closed to within 100 yards in BRP Teresa Magbanua's boats. China Coast Guard vessel 2503 moved to shield the research ship. Beijing said the ship was in waters under China's jurisdiction. The coast guard said it left north around noon. No shot was reported.
- **Tank district:** On 28 September suspected militants on motorcycles opened fire on a traffic-police vehicle in Wazirabad Bazaar, Tank district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Associated Press reported three officers killed and three other people wounded. No group claimed the attack in that dispatch. Other reprints differ on the wounded count; the dead-officer figure does not. It is a provincial militant strike, not a confirmed cross-border battle.

Latin America / Caribbean

ELEVATED

Colombian police arrested the wife and daughter of Ecuador's "Fito"; Colombia expelled them two days later

What happened: On the morning of 27 September Colombian police arrested Inda Mariela Peñarrieta Tuárez and Michelle Jamileth Macías Peñarrieta in Sabana de Torres, Santander. They are the wife and daughter of José Adolfo Macías Villamar, known as "Fito," the former leader of Los Choneros. El País and El Comercio reported that both women are wanted in Ecuador for money laundering, on Interpol red notices, and that the operation involved Colombian, Ecuadorian and US authorities, including the FBI. The Associated Press, in a dispatch published on 28 September, reported the same names, the same town, the money-laundering warrants, and FBI and Ecuadorian backing. Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella said Colombia would not be a safe haven for the finances of transnational criminal groups and that he would send the women to face Ecuadorian justice. Interior minister John Reimberg said the same day that they were wanted for organised crime, illicit association and money laundering.

The arrest was not the end of the week. El Comercio reported that Migración Colombia confirmed their expulsion and that the two women arrived in Guayaquil at 23:00 on 29 September under police guard. They have been called to trial in the "Blanqueo Fito" money-laundering case and, according to El Comercio, have had preventive-detention orders since September 2025. An arrest on an Interpol notice is still not a conviction. Wider case totals cited by prosecutors — including sums attributed to the structure as a whole — are not a new 2026 transaction tally for these two defendants.

The arrest is a financial and fugitive case, not a prison riot. Macías was recaptured in June 2025 and extradited to the United States, where he faces federal drug and weapons charges and has pleaded not guilty. The relatives' arrest in Santander, then their expulsion within 48 hours, shows cross-border police cooperation that worked. It does not show that Los Choneros have been dismantled in Guayaquil or Esmeraldas. The relevant question for companies exposed to Ecuadorian contracting, port services or cash-intensive supply chains is whether the paper-company inquiry now produces named firms. The arrest alone does not.

Intelligence Assessment

Medium Latin America and the Caribbean remain elevated because Haiti's year-to-date toll, as stated by the UN rights chief on 2 October, is already above 5,700 killed or injured, and because Ecuador's most prominent gang case produced a cross-border arrest and a 29 September expulsion. Confidence is high in the Sabana de Torres reporting and in Türk's figures, but those figures run only to 11 September. The Manta intercept is a drug seizure, not a prison massacre. The rating is prolonged armed-criminal pressure, not a new regional shock.

ALSO MONITORED THIS WEEK

- **Haiti's cumulative toll:** On 2 October the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said more than 5,700 people had been killed or injured by gangs or during operations against them between 1 January and 11 September 2026. More than 230 were kidnapped. About 1,000 women and girls were raped, a figure he said was likely higher. More than half the casualties fell during security operations. Child recruitment into gangs had nearly tripled. Türk said credible conditions for the 13 December election were hard to imagine. These are year-to-date registers, not a count of this week.
- **Manta intercept:** On 3 October Ecuador's navy destroyed a modified go-fast west of Manta after intercepting about 2.3 tonnes of suspected drugs in 55 packages, which the defence ministry valued at roughly 50 million dollars on the US market. Three Ecuadorian citizens were detained. Defence minister Gian Carlo Loffredo said the boat was destroyed because leaving it adrift, or towing it, would endanger other shipping and the boarding party. That is an official seizure and a stated procedure. It is not evidence of a firefight, and it is not the same thing as a US strike on a vessel in international waters.

- **Mona Passage:** The Associated Press reported on 29 September that the US Coast Guard had rescued 49 people and was still searching for about 10 after a migrant boat carrying 62 passengers capsized west of Puerto Rico, near Mona Island, on Sunday night, 27 September. At least three bodies had been recovered. A Coast Guard spokesman said a passenger had attacked others with a machete, causing a panic, and that most of those aboard were Dominican, with two believed to be Haitian. This is a maritime rescue and a violent incident at sea. It is not a change in gang control ashore in Haiti.

Global Intelligence Assessment

The week's centre is physical damage to systems companies use every day, and a separate failure of the appliances that control access to those companies. UKMTO classified seven Hormuz warnings, 144-26 through 150-26, as attacks, including an engine-room hit whose timing is still open and a fire-and-blackout whose timing is not. Kyiv's thermal plant was damaged, emergency power cuts returned to the capital, and Moscow then said the strikes would intensify. Those campaigns do not share a weapon. They share a result: a restored headline — 8,000 homes, a ship underway, crew safe — does not retire the next strike.

Spillover stayed bounded. Moldovan soil took missile and drone debris on 3 October, with no casualties reported. Vilnius airport closed for about an hour the same morning for an object that has not been identified. Neither event is a NATO-Russia clash. The Taiz-Aden road cut isolated a city while a counter-offensive was announced and fighting was still described as ongoing. It does not explain who is firing east of Oman. Off Pag-asa, a coast-guard blockage and a navy helicopter stopped a law-enforcement run without a reported casualty. At Ban Keun, Beijing opened a pilot-training site and named no aircraft.

Response capacity is what stretches an incident. South Sudan's September outlook warns that conflict, drought and economic pressure could worsen food access and famine risk — a forecast, not a declaration, and not a Sahel event. Haiti's UN figures, current only through 11 September, already describe thousands killed or injured, many during security operations. Mali's Niono ambush shows JNIM can still kill Russian paramilitaries on a central road; the army has not confirmed the toll. Amnesty's 29 September report documents an older pattern of army and Wagner killings. It is a publication, not a new massacre this week. Ecuador's news was an arrest in Colombia, an expulsion two days later, and a navy drug intercept off Manta. None of that reduces gang pressure in Guayaquil.

There is no single escalation path. The Strait was not shown to have closed. Kyiv's power was not shown to have failed nationally. Ban Keun was not shown to be a combat deployment. Pag-asa was not shown to have changed hands. No new fatality was confirmed in this week's Hormuz cards.

Global cyber exposure — access appliances

CVE-2026-88779 is a SAML-preconditioned denial of service, not last week's code-execution pair. Citrix bulletin CTX697174, created and last modified on 4 October, rates it high severity, CVSS v4.0 8.7, with impact scored on availability only. The appliance must be a SAML service provider or identity provider. Affected trains are 14.1 before 14.1-73.41, 13.1 before 13.1-64.28, and the matching FIPS lines through 14.1-73.41 FIPS and 13.1-37.282. Customer-managed appliances and Secure Private Access Hybrid instances on those builds are in scope. Citrix-managed cloud services are not. CISA's catalogue, consulted on 5 October, lists the same CVE as denial of service, added 4 October, due 7 October, forensic triage required. It does not say remote code execution is established.

September patches do not close it. CISA's alert of 27 September, revised on 2 October, still covers only CVE-2026-88771 through CVE-2026-88778, and says 88771 and 88772 can each enable remote code execution. That alert does not mention 88779. The 7 October due date binds covered US civilian agencies. It is not a private-sector legal deadline. No named victim is established here.

FortiMail still had no shipped fix on 5 October. FG-IR-26-175 told customers to move to upcoming 8.0.2, 7.6.7 or 7.4.9, or off the 7.2 train onto 7.4. Fortinet said an unauthenticated attacker may write arbitrary files over HTTP or HTTPS, that exploitation in the wild has been reported, and that a workaround — identity-based encryption off, or the webmail interface kept off the internet — was the available step. CISA added CVE-2026-104286 on 1 October, due 4 October. The due date has passed. "Patched" would be the wrong word.

Zammad came due the same morning. CISA added CVE-2026-102489 and CVE-2026-102490 on 2 October, due 5 October, both with forensic triage required. The first can lead to code execution as the zammad user. The second lets that user escalate to root. CISA says they can be chained. No named victim is established. A manager who treats NetScaler, FortiMail and Zammad as one ticket will patch the wrong appliance.

Watch Indicators

- **A UKMTO product after 151-26** that names a hull, confirms a fatality or pollution, or classifies a new incident south of Al Mukha as an attack. A confirmed report time for warning 150-26 would date the engine-room hit.
- **An owner or flag-state identification** of any vessel in warnings 144-26 through 150-26. Until then, a public card cannot be matched to a named ship.
- **Fortinet language** that replaces "upcoming" 8.0.2, 7.6.7 and 7.4.9 with shipped builds. NetScaler outage reporting tied to CVE-2026-88779, as distinct from CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772, would separate the two Citrix problems in practice. The 7 October date is a US civilian-agency clock.
- **One Ukrainian death toll for 30 September**, or a further confirmed hit on Trypilska after the 4 October Russian statement. A Moldovan or Lithuanian identification of the 3 October debris, or of the Vilnius object, would move those items out of the unidentified category.
- **A wire that the Taiz–Aden road has reopened or remains cut.** Houthi media claims of Saudi strikes need a second source before they enter a strike log.
- **A further blockage, collision or injury** off Pag-asa, Scarborough or Batanes, or a statement that names aircraft or a combat unit at Ban Keun.
- **A Malian or Nigerien casualty statement** on Niono, Birni-N'Konni or Abala-Filingué. A formal IPC famine declaration for an identified South Sudanese population would change that item from a risk statement to a declared outcome. Named firms in the Blanqueo Fito file would change the Ecuador item from an arrest to a financial map.

Glossary of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
AFP	Agence France-Presse
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (United States)
CVE	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone (Korean Peninsula)
EEZ	Exclusive economic zone
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
JNIM	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin
KEV	Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue
MDL	Military Demarcation Line
PLA	People's Liberation Army

Abbreviation	Meaning
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
PSIRT	Product Security Incident Response Team
UKMTO	United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
UNC	United Nations Command

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Method Note

This report is based on open-source material reviewed up to 5 October 2026 and analytical assessment by SF Custos Global. It does not replace legal, insurance, sanctions, medical or country-specific professional advice.