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WEEKLY SECURITY BRIEFING

21 September 2026

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Weekly Security Briefing

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Executive Summary — This Week's Key Global Developments

- **Maritime security:** Two separate reports on 17 September placed commercial shipping at risk on opposite sides of the Arabian Peninsula. UKMTO warning 137-26 concerned an attack 16 nautical miles northeast of Khasab; the unnamed vessel's crew was safe and no environmental impact was confirmed. Warning 136-26 concerned a westbound tanker 75 nautical miles east of Aden that reported pursuit and an attempted interception by a skiff at 13:59 UTC. UKMTO classified the Aden event as suspicious activity. The reports do not establish a common attacker, method or campaign, and neither establishes closure of the Strait of Hormuz or Gulf of Aden.
- **Ukraine war:** Ukraine conducted what the Institute for the Study of War assessed as its largest combined missile-and-drone strike against Moscow Oblast during the night of 19–20 September. The reach and composition of the attack demonstrate a continuing Ukrainian ability to impose security and air-defence demands far from the front. On the ground, Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction showed improved Ukrainian tactical manoeuvre, while Russian official claims continued to exaggerate advances. These developments complicate a linear narrative of Russian momentum without changing the severe exposure of Ukrainian cities, infrastructure and personnel.
- **Civilian harm:** A Russian attack on Odesa on 18 September struck an 11-storey administrative building and was followed by a second strike while rescue activity was under way. Ukrainian emergency-service reporting carried by Ukrinform put the number injured at ten, including two rescuers. The sequence illustrates the additional danger faced by emergency personnel and by civilians who remain near an impact site. It does not establish that every subsequent explosion is deliberately directed at responders, but it raises the consequences of uncertain strike intervals in urban areas.
- **Cybercrime at scale:** A joint Japanese, US, Australian and German advisory on 18 September described the WaterPlum operation as having affected at least 30,000 devices in more than 100 countries between December 2025 and July 2026. Authorities associated the activity with more than 7,000 cryptocurrency wallets and losses of about JPY1.7 billion, or US\$10.71 million. Separately, Helpfeel disclosed exposure concerning approximately 23.62 million Gyazo user records and roughly 490 million image-metadata records; it said payment-card data was not involved. These are global corporate and personal-data issues, not incidents confined to the countries issuing the notices.
- **Africa security and capacity:** Reporting published on 18 September said at least 100 Malian soldiers and five Russian Africa Corps personnel were killed after JNIM overran the Dioura camp on 10 September. The account concerns the camp attack and should not be combined with unverified convoy-loss claims. Elsewhere, Chad was hosting 944,933 Sudanese refugees who had arrived since April 2023, while cholera had reached 599 cases and 28 deaths by 25 August. The interaction of armed pressure, displacement and weak health capacity remains more consequential than any single continental risk label.

- **Disaster recovery:** Nepal's flood and landslide emergency remained dominated by unresolved loss rather than a completed casualty picture. Reuters reported on 16 September, citing NDRRMA, that at least 1,399 people had died and about 5,200 were missing; only around seven per cent of recovered bodies had been identified, and 636 foreign nationals were among those missing. Colombia was also carrying large-scale consequences from the 10 August earthquake: UNGRD figures released on 15 September recorded 486,917 people affected, 36,478 homes destroyed and 335 deaths. In both cases, identification, access and shelter conditions are central to the continuing security impact.
- **Protection under pressure:** Human Rights Watch reported on 21 September that US deportation flights to Haiti were now arriving weekly in Cap-Haïtien because Port-au-Prince was considered unsafe, while US aviation restrictions affecting the capital had been extended to 2 March 2027. Lebanon's early-September humanitarian picture also remained severe: UNFPA recorded at least 27 people killed and 69 injured, including paramedics, during intensified violence from 4–7 September. The same report described the destruction of Nabatieh hospital and suspension of maternity services at two hospitals in Bint Jbeil. These cases show public policy and transport decisions being shaped by environments in which safe access to basic services is already constrained.

Key Developments & Intelligence Assessment

Europe

HIGH

Ukraine demonstrated long-range reach while Russia's advance claims remained contested

What happened: During the night of 19–20 September, Ukrainian forces conducted what ISW assessed as the largest combined Ukrainian missile-and-drone strike against Moscow Oblast of the war to date. The significance lies in the combined character and geographical reach of the attack, not in an assumption that every munition reached its intended target. Such an operation can compel dispersal of air-defence attention, interrupt activity at specific facilities and impose uncertainty well beyond Ukraine's immediate border. It does not by itself establish lasting damage to a named industrial site, a sustained halt to Moscow-area transport or a decisive shift in the air campaign.

The ground picture remained more mixed than Russian announcements suggested. ISW's assessments for 14–20 September continued to challenge Russian Ministry of Defence descriptions of advances. Official claims may serve political and mobilisation narratives as well as battlefield reporting, particularly when territorial change is limited, temporary or not supported by geolocated evidence. This distinction matters because a stated capture, an infiltration and durable control are not equivalent. Russia retained the ability to attack across several axes and continued to expose Ukrainian positions and settlements to severe danger. The analytical correction is therefore not that Russian pressure has ended, but that the speed and permanence of reported gains require verification.

Operation Vivaldi offered evidence of improved Ukrainian tactical manoeuvre around Lyman. The operation indicated an ability to coordinate movement and contest Russian initiative in a sector where pressure has remained persistent. A successful local action can disrupt an adversary's timetable, recover tactically useful ground or force reinforcement. It cannot safely be extended into a conclusion about the whole front. The commercial and civilian picture near Lyman remains defined by active combat, damaged infrastructure and uncertain access even when Ukrainian units improve their local position.

Why it matters: Long-range Ukrainian attacks increase the number of Russian regions in which authorities and companies must account for air alerts, defensive activity and temporary restrictions. The most immediate effects can arise from precautionary decisions—airspace controls, facility inspections or delayed movements—rather than verified physical destruction. For international businesses, the relevant evidence is the status of a named airport, plant, road or rail connection. Strategic descriptions of strike scale do not substitute for local operating information.

Odesa's rescue phase became part of the attack exposure

What happened: On 18 September, a Russian attack damaged an 11-storey administrative building in Odesa. According to Ukraine's State Emergency Service, as reported by Ukrinform, a second strike occurred during rescue activity. The reported injury count rose to ten, including two rescuers. The available account supports the occurrence of a second impact and harm to emergency personnel. It does not provide a sufficient basis to infer the munition's targeting logic or to treat all rescue scenes as intentionally attacked.

The sequence nevertheless changes the practical meaning of an urban strike. An impact site attracts responders, building occupants, relatives, police and onlookers. A further strike before the area is stabilised can turn the rescue perimeter into a second casualty location and delay entry into damaged structures. The consequences may include slower fire suppression, interrupted searches and wider cordons. Those effects can continue after the last explosion because structural integrity and unexploded hazards remain uncertain.

Why it matters: Odesa remains an important Black Sea city and logistics centre where military danger intersects with port, municipal and commercial activity. Repeated strike sequences increase uncertainty around the duration of a local incident and can enlarge exclusion areas. The effect on a particular shipment, office or journey depends on location and verified

service notices. The attack does not establish a general halt to port operations, but it reinforces the judgement that routine urban activity can be interrupted with little warning.

Intelligence Assessment

High Europe's high rating is driven by the continuing Russia–Ukraine war, demonstrated Ukrainian reach into Moscow Oblast and repeated Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities. Confidence is high that the conflict is imposing security demands far beyond the ground front and that rescue activity in Odesa was exposed to a second strike. Confidence is lower in claims about durable territorial change or lasting damage from the Moscow-area attack. Operation Vivaldi supports a judgement of improved Ukrainian tactical performance in one sector, not a general reversal of the campaign.

ALSO MONITORED THIS WEEK

- **Political control and mobilisation:** Russian election messaging and narratives around manpower continued to present state authority and military endurance. The most consequential indicators would be enacted legal or administrative measures affecting call-up, employment or movement; rhetoric alone does not establish the scale or timing of further mobilisation.
- **Civilian infrastructure:** Repeated attacks across Ukraine continued to create short-notice disruption to energy, transport and public services. Local restoration notices and facility-specific damage reports remain more reliable measures of business impact than national strike totals.
- **Front-line claims:** Russian and Ukrainian statements continued to describe gains and counteractions in contested areas. Geolocated evidence and sustained presence are needed to distinguish raids, infiltrations and temporary positions from durable control.

Middle East

CRITICAL

Separate incidents near Khasab and Aden kept two maritime corridors under pressure

What happened near Khasab: UKMTO warning 137-26, issued on 17 September, concerned an attack approximately 16 nautical miles northeast of Khasab. The vessel was not named in the information available for this report. Its crew was reported safe, and no environmental impact had been confirmed. Those points limit the supported immediate consequence: there was an attack report, but no confirmed casualty or pollution outcome. The absence of a named vessel also prevents a sound assessment of whether flag, ownership, cargo or voyage history influenced the incident.

What happened east of Aden: UKMTO warning 136-26 recorded suspicious activity at 13:59 UTC on 17 September, approximately 75 nautical miles east of Aden. A westbound tanker reported that a skiff pursued it and attempted to intercept it. The classification and conduct described are important. Pursuit and attempted interception can create acute navigational and crew-security danger without amounting to a successful boarding or confirmed attack. No shared actor with the Khasab incident was established.

The two reports should remain analytically separate. They occurred on the same date but in different bodies of water, involved different circumstances and carried different UKMTO classifications. Khasab sits beside the Strait of Hormuz, while the Aden report concerned a vessel farther west in the Gulf of Aden. Combining them into one incident or assigning both to a single campaign would create certainty not present in the source material. Later UKMTO products dated 18 September exist, but their content is not needed to describe or reinterpret these two 17 September events.

Why it matters: The simultaneous presence of attack reporting near Hormuz and interception behaviour near Aden increases uncertainty at two internationally important maritime approaches. An individual incident may cause no verified casualty or pollution while still affecting voyage planning, crew confidence, insurance consideration and reporting burden. The impact is greatest where companies rely on narrow routes and cannot easily substitute timing, vessel or destination. Neither warning states that a strait was closed, that traffic stopped or that all tankers faced the same targeting condition.

Lebanon's medical and maternity capacity remained exposed to violence

What happened: UNFPA's Lebanon situation report covering 7 August–8 September recorded at least 27 people killed and 69 injured, including paramedics, during intensified violence from 4–7 September. It also described the destruction of Nabatieh hospital and suspension of maternity services at two hospitals in Bint Jbeil. These figures cover several days of violence and should not be presented as casualties from a single attack. The inclusion of paramedics among those injured is especially relevant because it indicates harm reaching personnel responsible for emergency care.

Southern Lebanon remained the principal geographical concern. Continuing insecurity in the south can affect schools as well as health services, changing family movement and staff availability. School interruption is a secondary indicator of wider community stress: it may reflect direct damage, displacement, transport danger or use of buildings for other purposes. The evidence should not be generalised into a nationwide closure without a specific education authority statement.

Why it matters: Civilian harm becomes harder to contain when responders and essential services are themselves exposed. Medical and maternity interruption can produce consequences outside the immediate strike area through referral pressure and delayed care. For organisations with personnel in Lebanon, the relevant picture is local and service-specific. The reporting supports a critical regional assessment because maritime danger and active conflict effects coexist, not because every country or facility faces identical conditions.

Intelligence Assessment

High The Middle East remains critical because separate maritime security events affected the approaches to Hormuz and Aden while conflict continued to damage civilian-service continuity in Lebanon. Confidence is high in the basic UKMTO distinctions: warning 137-26 was an attack near Khasab with crew safe and no confirmed environmental impact, while warning 136-26 was suspicious activity involving an attempted interception east of Aden. Attribution and any common campaign remain unestablished. Lebanon's documented early-September harm to paramedics, destruction of Nabatieh hospital and suspension of maternity services at two Bint Jbeil hospitals raise the consequences of further violence even where individual services continue.

ALSO MONITORED THIS WEEK

- **Occupied Palestinian territory education:** School continuity remained vulnerable to conflict, displacement and access restrictions. Interruptions to education are relevant as evidence of family displacement and service strain, but isolated reports should not be converted into a claim that all schools across the territory share the same status.
- **Southern Lebanon schools:** Local insecurity continued to affect the conditions under which schools can open and families can travel. Verified local authority notices are necessary to distinguish precautionary closure, physical damage and longer displacement.
- **Maritime follow-up:** Vessel identification, flag-state or owner statements, and any confirmed damage from the Khasab event would materially refine targeting analysis. Evidence of boarding, weapons use or a named perpetrator in the Aden case would change its assessment beyond suspicious activity.

Africa

HIGH

The Dioura camp loss exposed severe pressure on Mali's security forces

What happened: AFP reporting published on 18 September said that at least 100 Malian soldiers and five Russian Africa Corps personnel were killed after JNIM overran the Dioura military camp on 10 September. The scale reported, if sustained by subsequent accounting, represents a major loss at a fixed security position. The event should be kept separate from any claim about a convoy. The verified fact set for this report concerns the overrun camp, the date and the reported fatalities; it does not support importing casualty numbers or circumstances from another alleged engagement.

A camp overrun has consequences beyond the death toll. It can remove a local security presence, yield weapons or supplies to attackers, weaken confidence among nearby communities and force surviving units to regroup. The duration of militant control and the extent of captured materiel were not established in the facts available here. Nor does one severe defeat demonstrate that every Malian garrison faces immediate collapse. It does, however, show JNIM's capacity to concentrate force against a defended position and inflict losses on both Malian and foreign personnel.

Why it matters: Severe losses at a camp can alter local movement before any formal change in territorial control is announced. Roads may become less predictable, patrol patterns may change and surrounding communities may face coercion from multiple actors. For commercial or humanitarian activity, the location and response matter more than a national incident count. Dioura's fall supports a high concern about security-force resilience in affected parts of Mali, while leaving open the duration and geographical reach of the immediate aftermath.

Chad's refugee burden coincided with an active cholera emergency

What happened: UNFPA's August reporting recorded 944,933 Sudanese refugees arriving in Chad since April 2023. By 25 August, cholera reporting had reached 599 cases and 28 deaths. These figures describe different but interacting pressures: a cumulative refugee population and a disease count current to a specific August date. They should not be added together or presented as new arrivals and deaths during the current week.

Large-scale displacement increases demand on already limited services. Refugee settlements and host communities require water, sanitation, shelter, maternal care and disease surveillance. Cholera risk rises where safe water and rapid treatment are insufficient, but the national totals do not show that every refugee site was affected. The case-fatality picture also depends on the speed of diagnosis and access to rehydration and clinical care. Absence of a recent count for a locality is not evidence that transmission has stopped.

Cameroon faced overlapping armed and environmental disruption

What happened: August reporting from Cameroon described armed activity in the Far North, ghost-town restrictions in the Northwest and Southwest, and flooding. These are distinct sources of disruption. Armed incidents in the Far North should not be merged with separatist-linked shutdown practices in the Anglophone regions, and neither should be used to explain flood impacts without local evidence.

Why it matters: The African risk picture this week is defined by interactions between armed pressure and thin response capacity. Mali shows the capacity of an armed group to defeat a fixed position; Chad shows the demands created by displacement and disease; Cameroon shows simultaneous security and weather-related interruption. None supports treating Africa as a uniform theatre. Together, they justify a high rating because multiple local systems have limited room to absorb further shocks.

Intelligence Assessment

Medium Africa's high rating reflects the reported scale of the Dioura camp losses and the interaction of displacement, disease, armed restrictions and flooding elsewhere. Confidence is medium because the Mali casualty account is substantial but still depends on reporting published after the event, while the duration of JNIM's local control and the security response remain unclear. Confidence is higher in the dated UNFPA figures for Chad. The central judgement is geographically bounded: several affected areas face reduced security or response capacity, not a uniform continental deterioration.

ALSO MONITORED THIS WEEK

- **Mali attribution and aftermath:** JNIM was reported to have overrun the Dioura camp on 10 September. Confirmed control duration, recovered or captured equipment, and official personnel accounting would clarify the military consequence; separate convoy claims are not treated as part of this event.
- **Chad health access:** Cholera transmission, treatment availability and safe-water access remained consequential alongside the cumulative arrival of 944,933 Sudanese refugees. Later locality-level health reporting would show whether the 25 August totals marked expansion, stabilisation or undercounting.
- **Cameroon continuity:** Armed activity in the Far North, ghost-town restrictions in the Northwest and Southwest, and floods continued to affect different locations through different mechanisms. Local road, school and market status remains necessary for an accurate impact assessment.

Asia

ELEVATED

Nepal's disaster remained an identification and access emergency

What happened: Reuters reported on 16 September, citing Nepal's National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority, that at least 1,399 people had died following the floods and landslides and about 5,200 remained missing. Only approximately seven per cent of recovered bodies had been identified. The missing included 636 foreign nationals. These figures show that the emergency had not reached a stable final accounting: the number missing is not a confirmed death toll, while the low identification rate limits confidence about overlap between recovered bodies and missing-person lists.

Why it matters: Nepal's disaster affects transport, tourism, public administration and local services even outside the most heavily damaged communities. Foreign-national cases can generate pressure for consular information before authorities have completed identification. Aggregate numbers communicate scale but do not establish the status of a particular district, trekking route, airport connection or person. Reliable local reopening and access notices remain the appropriate evidence for continuity judgements.

WaterPlum showed the global reach of device and cryptocurrency compromise

What happened: On 18 September, authorities from Japan, the United States, Australia and Germany issued a joint advisory on WaterPlum. The advisory described at least 30,000 affected devices across more than 100 countries and more than 7,000 associated cryptocurrency wallets between December 2025 and July 2026. Reported losses were approximately JPY1.7 billion, equivalent to US\$10.71 million. The figures are official estimates for a defined historical period, not a count of new compromises during the publication week.

The breadth of countries is more important than the advisory's national origins. A campaign reaching more than 100 countries is a global exposure involving personal devices, credentials and digital assets across jurisdictions. Wallet count is not identical to victim count: one person may use multiple wallets, and a wallet may have more than one relevant transaction. Similarly, an affected device does not necessarily equal a completed financial loss. Maintaining those distinctions avoids overstating the known number of victims while preserving the advisory's clear evidence of scale.

Gyazo and ScreenConnect raised separate global enterprise concerns

What happened: Helpfeel announced on 16 September that the Gyazo incident concerned approximately 23.62 million user records and about 490 million image-metadata records. The company said payment-card information was not involved. Metadata can still expose account or content relationships, timestamps and other contextual information depending on the fields affected. The very large metadata count should not be described as 490 million separate people, and the user-record figure should not be added to it as if the datasets represented wholly distinct individuals.

ScreenConnect presented a different form of exposure. CVE-2026-84869 was under active exploitation and entered CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue with a due date of 14 September for covered US federal civilian agencies. The flaw affected the client, not the server, and ConnectWise fixed it in version 26.6.5. This distinction matters: server inventory alone is insufficient to describe the vulnerable component, and the federal due date is not a universal private-sector legal deadline.

Why it matters: WaterPlum, Gyazo and ScreenConnect concern three different security problems—malicious compromise linked to digital-asset theft, large-scale record exposure and exploitation of remote-support software. Grouping them under cyber risk is useful only if their mechanisms remain separate. The supported global judgement is that device compromise, data exposure and trusted remote access can each cross national boundaries rapidly. No product disclosure establishes that a particular company was compromised merely because it used the service.

Intelligence Assessment

High Asia is elevated because Nepal's disaster still combines a very high confirmed death toll with thousands missing and exceptionally low identification, while cyber incidents originating or disclosed in the region have global reach. Confidence is high in the dated official and corporate figures, with the qualification that affected devices, wallets, user records and metadata records count different units. ScreenConnect exploitation is established, but organisation-specific compromise is not. No verified development this week supports treating Taiwan Strait or Korean Peninsula commercial movement as generally suspended.

ALSO MONITORED THIS WEEK

- **China–Taiwan:** The 18 September assessment provided context on continuing military and political signalling. A material commercial change would require verified restrictions, sustained changes in deployment or disruption to named transport links; strategic tension alone does not establish those outcomes.
- **Korean Peninsula:** The 16 September assessment was treated as a local indicator of continuing security competition. No specific fact in the material used here establishes a new general constraint on civilian travel or trade during the week.
- **Cyber follow-through:** WaterPlum victim and loss estimates cover December 2025–July 2026; Gyazo's disclosure distinguishes user records from image metadata and excludes payment cards; ScreenConnect remediation centres on client version 26.6.5 rather than the server.

Latin America / Caribbean

ELEVATED

Colombia's earthquake consequences remained national in scale but locally uneven

What happened: Colombia's UNGRD reported on 15 September that the 10 August earthquake had affected 486,917 people, destroyed 36,478 homes and caused 335 deaths. The date distinction is important: the earthquake did not occur on 15 September; that was the reporting date for an updated consequence picture. The totals show an emergency extending well beyond immediate search and rescue, particularly through housing loss and displacement.

Destroyed homes are a long-duration security issue. Loss of shelter can separate families from employment, schools, health care and official records. It can also increase dependence on temporary accommodation and public support. The national aggregate does not establish identical conditions across municipalities, and it does not show how many affected people remained displaced on 15 September. Nevertheless, the scale of destroyed housing indicates that recovery cannot be measured solely through reopened roads or the absence of new seismic damage.

Armed-group growth challenged Colombia's Total Peace assumptions

What happened: InSight Crime reported on 15 September that armed-group membership had increased since 2022 during the period of Colombia's Total Peace policy. The available finding supports a direction of change, not a precise current endpoint. Without a consistently defined and sourced terminal figure, an exact membership total would imply false precision. Group strength is also not measured only by headcount: territorial presence, coercive influence, financing and the ability to replace losses can produce different security effects.

The finding matters because negotiation and armed expansion can coexist. A peace policy may reduce violence in one place or create channels for talks while groups recruit, fragment or compete elsewhere. Increased membership does not prove that every negotiation failed, nor does it establish uniform deterioration across Colombia. It does challenge any assumption that the existence of talks has automatically reduced armed capacity nationwide.

Haiti deportations were redirected into an already unsafe national environment

What happened: Human Rights Watch reported on 21 September that US deportation flights to Haiti were operating weekly to Cap-Haïtien because Port-au-Prince was considered unsafe. The report also said US Federal Aviation Administration restrictions affecting Port-au-Prince had been extended to 2 March 2027. The use of Cap-Haïtien does not establish that the destination is safe in an absolute sense; it shows that aviation and security constraints around the capital are shaping where flights can arrive.

Why it matters: Colombia and Haiti show different forms of prolonged exposure. Colombia faces a major disaster recovery burden alongside evidence that armed-group membership has grown since 2022. Haiti faces insecurity severe enough to shape deportation routes and extend aviation restrictions. In both cases, national-level indicators must be translated into named local conditions; neither country is uniformly inaccessible, but both contain areas where public authority and service capacity are under acute strain.

Intelligence Assessment

High Latin America and the Caribbean remain elevated. Confidence is high in UNGRD's dated Colombian earthquake figures and in the reported redirection and frequency of US deportation flights to Haiti. The earthquake's housing destruction creates a long recovery horizon, while increased armed-group membership since 2022 challenges claims of automatic security improvement under Total Peace. The exact present size of Colombia's armed groups is not stated because the available finding supports a trend rather than a verified endpoint. Haiti's aviation constraints indicate persistent danger around Port-au-Prince but do not establish identical conditions nationwide.

ALSO MONITORED THIS WEEK

- **Colombian recovery:** Updated municipality-level shelter, utility and transport information would clarify how the 486,917 affected people and 36,478 destroyed homes translate into current displacement and service interruption. The 15 September figures describe consequences of the 10 August earthquake.
- **Total Peace:** Recruitment, fragmentation, territorial presence and verified ceasefire compliance will show whether increased armed-group membership produces broader coercive capacity. An exact current membership total is not inferred from the trend finding.
- **Haiti access:** The use of Cap-Haïtien for weekly US deportation flights and the extension of FAA restrictions to 2 March 2027 show that insecurity is restructuring air access. Onward conditions for returnees remain distinct from the safety of the arrival flight itself.

Global Intelligence Assessment

This week's most important pattern is the widening distance between an incident and its consequences. Ukraine's strike into Moscow Oblast projected effects far from the ground front, while Odesa showed a rescue scene becoming exposed to renewed attack. Maritime incidents near Khasab and Aden occurred in different corridors but can influence decisions throughout shipping networks. Nepal's missing-person and identification crisis extends the human consequences of flooding well after initial rescue. A narrow reading of the initiating event therefore understates the security burden created by response, verification and recovery.

Network exposure does not establish common causation. The Khasab attack and Aden suspicious activity both affect maritime trade, but no common actor or method is established. WaterPlum, Gyazo and ScreenConnect all concern cyber security, yet one involves a multinational cybercrime investigation, another a large disclosure of user and metadata records, and the third an actively exploited client-side software vulnerability. Analytical clarity depends on preserving those boundaries. Similar business effects—delay, uncertainty, investigation or additional cost—do not prove that incidents form one campaign.

Response capacity is becoming a decisive risk variable. Lebanon's disrupted hospital and maternity services, Chad's refugee and cholera burdens, Cameroon's overlap of armed restrictions and flooding, and Colombia's destroyed housing all show how a second pressure can be more damaging when services are already stretched. This does not require a new attack to produce deterioration. A blocked road, absent health worker or delayed identification process may determine the real impact on a family or employer more directly than a national risk rating.

The global cyber picture is both large and specific. WaterPlum's more than 100-country reach demonstrates that digital-asset crime can scale across jurisdictions. Gyazo's disclosure shows how a large metadata corpus can be exposed without payment-card information being involved. ScreenConnect shows how a client-side flaw in trusted support software can become an active exploitation issue. These events support high confidence in global exposure, but they do not permit assumptions about the compromise of an individual organisation without its own evidence.

The overall outlook remains one of concentrated crises connected through trade, movement and service dependencies. Europe's war affects distant regions and urban response; Middle Eastern insecurity reaches maritime routes and civilian medicine; African conflicts interact with displacement and disease; Asian disaster and cyber events carry international consequences; and the Americas face prolonged recovery and access constraints. The report does not identify one unified global escalation. It identifies multiple severe local situations whose consequences travel through shared systems.

Watch Indicators

- **Ukraine strike effects:** Verified facility damage, airport or transport interruptions, and Russian defensive redeployment following the 19–20 September attack would clarify its lasting significance. Strike scale alone does not establish duration of disruption.
- **Lyman sector:** Geolocated control changes, repeated Ukrainian manoeuvre and Russian reinforcement would show whether Operation Vivaldi produced a durable local advantage or a temporary tactical result.
- **Odesa response:** Updated emergency-service reporting on building stability, access restrictions and the condition of the injured would define the attack's continuing civilian and administrative effects.
- **Khasab incident detail:** Vessel identification, owner or flag-state statements, damage information and attribution evidence would refine warning 137-26. Confirmed pollution would represent a change from the current finding of no environmental impact confirmed.
- **Aden activity:** Evidence of weapons, boarding, repeated pursuit at the same location or identification of the skiff's affiliation would change warning 136-26 beyond its suspicious-activity classification.
- **Lebanon services:** Verified hospital or maternity-service restoration, further attacks affecting medical staff, and local school status would indicate whether early-September disruption is easing or compounding.
- **Mali aftermath:** Official casualty reconciliation, duration of JNIM presence at Dioura, and evidence of equipment capture or force redistribution would clarify the camp attack's longer military effect.
- **Chad cholera:** Updated case and fatality counts, geographical spread and treatment access would show whether the 25 August figures represented containment or continuing deterioration amid refugee pressure.
- **Nepal identification:** Reconciliation of missing lists, identification of recovered bodies and restored access to isolated areas would materially change the casualty picture, including the status of 636 missing foreigners.
- **Cyber exposure:** Additional WaterPlum attribution or recovery figures, Helpfeel's field-level disclosure detail, and evidence of ScreenConnect compromise on client version 26.6.5 or later would refine the three separate assessments.
- **Colombia recovery:** Municipality-level displacement, housing and utility updates would reveal where national earthquake totals continue to translate into acute access or shelter problems.
- **Haiti aviation:** Changes to FAA restrictions, flight destinations or onward reception conditions for deportees would indicate whether current routing remains stable through the stated 2 March 2027 limit.

Glossary of Abbreviations

- **AFP:** Agence France-Presse.
- **CISA:** Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, United States.
- **CVE:** Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures identifier.
- **FAA:** Federal Aviation Administration, United States.
- **HRW:** Human Rights Watch.
- **ISW:** Institute for the Study of War.
- **JNIM:** Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin.
- **JPY:** Japanese yen.
- **KEV:** Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue.
- **NDRRMA:** National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority, Nepal.

- **SES:** State Emergency Service of Ukraine.
- **UKMTO:** United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations.
- **UNFPA:** United Nations Population Fund.
- **UNGRD:** National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, Colombia.
- **US\$:** United States dollars.
- **UTC:** Coordinated Universal Time.

Selected Sources

Europe

- **Ukraine campaign:** Institute for the Study of War, [Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments](#), 14–20 September 2026, including assessment of the 19–20 September combined strike against Moscow Oblast, Russian advance claims, Operation Vivaldi and political-mobilisation narratives.
- **Odesa:** Ukrinform, [Injury toll in Russian attack on Odesa rises to 10, including two rescuers](#), 18 September 2026, citing the State Emergency Service of Ukraine.

Middle East

- **Maritime security:** United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, warning 136-26 and warning 137-26, 17 September 2026, available through the [UKMTO reporting portal](#).
- **Lebanon:** United Nations Population Fund, [Lebanon Crisis Situation Report, 7 August–8 September 2026](#).

Africa

- **Mali:** Agence France-Presse reporting published 18 September 2026 on the JNIM overrun of the Dioura camp on 10 September and reported deaths among Malian soldiers and Russian Africa Corps personnel, available through [AFP](#).
- **Chad and Cameroon:** United Nations Population Fund humanitarian reporting for August 2026, available through the [UNFPA emergencies portal](#); Cameroon humanitarian situation reporting available through [ReliefWeb](#).

Asia and global cybersecurity

- **Nepal:** Reuters, [Weeks after Nepal flood, thousands still missing, most recovered bodies unidentified](#), 16 September 2026, citing NDRRMA.
- **WaterPlum:** Joint Japanese, US, Australian and German authorities, [Cybersecurity Advisory on WaterPlum](#), 18 September 2026.
- **Gyazo:** Helpfeel, [security incident announcement](#), 16 September 2026.
- **ScreenConnect:** US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, [Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue entry for CVE-2026-84869](#); ConnectWise fix information for ScreenConnect version 26.6.5.
- **Regional strategic context:** Institute for the Study of War, [China–Taiwan research](#) dated 18 September 2026 and [Korean Peninsula research](#) dated 16 September 2026.

Latin America and the Caribbean

- **Colombia earthquake:** Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres, official update dated 15 September 2026 on consequences of the 10 August earthquake, available through [UNGRD](#).

- **Colombia armed groups:** InSight Crime, [Colombia coverage](#), 15 September 2026, on armed-group membership trends since 2022 under Total Peace.
- **Haiti:** Human Rights Watch, [US Deportations to Haiti Endanger Lives](#), 21 September 2026.

Method Note

This report separates verified incident details, official or institutional estimates and analytical judgements. Casualty, displacement, affected-device and exposed-record figures retain their source dates and units; they are not treated as interchangeable measures. Where attribution, damage duration or geographical reach was not established, the text states that limit rather than extending a local finding to a whole country or region.

This report is based on open-source material reviewed up to 21 September 2026 and analytical assessment by SF Custos Global. It does not replace legal, insurance, sanctions, medical or country-specific professional advice.